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19 May 1956

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
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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
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## 2. KOREAN ELECTION REFLECTS RHEE'S DIMINISHED PRESTIGE

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The South Korean election reflects considerable dissatisfaction with the administration of President Rhee and a decline in Rhee's personal prestige.

With fewer than 300,000 votes not tallied, Democrat Chang Myon retains a lead of almost 75,000 votes over Rhee's running mate, Yi Ki-pung. The uncounted ballots are from the antiadministration stronghold of Taegu. Liberal Party spokesmen there have accused the Democrats of bribing election officials, and have called for a new election in Taegu and a nationwide recount.

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government crowds continue to gather in the cities, and tear gas has been issued to army units.

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While opposition sentiment has always been strong in the cities, the failure of rural areas to provide Yi Ki-pung with sufficient majorities suggests that Rhee's prestige even among rural voters is no longer sufficient to offset the unpopularity of the Liberal Party.

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### 3. TOKEN WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM EAST GERMANY

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Moscow's withdrawal of one troop train of Soviet forces from East Germany four days after the announcement of the plan to cut Soviet armed forces by 1,200,000 was probably intended as

evidence of the USSR's intention to carry out these reductions. The Soviet leaders probably believe that this withdrawal will strengthen West German opponents of the conscription legislation soon to be considered by the Bundestag. They also may hope that their announced plan to withdraw 30,000 troops from East Germany will increase West German interest in exploring the possibility of reunification based on general disarmament and neutralization.

The withdrawal would constitute the first permanent reduction in Soviet ground strength in East Germany since the immediate postwar period.

Withdrawal of 30,000 troops would constitute a 7-percent reduction in Soviet strength in East Germany which includes 437,000 ground and air troops. Security in East Germany can be maintained by a much smaller number of troops. The small cut at this time suggests that the USSR may be reserving further reductions of forces in East Germany for future political advantage.

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**4. URUGUAY WILLING TO RECEIVE MIKOYAN**

The Uruguayan foreign minister informed an American embassy official on 4 May that he had told the Soviet minister Uruguay was willing to receive A. I. Mikoyan, a first deputy premier of the USSR. Although the Soviet minister to Uruguay observed that he had no official notification of a trip by Mikoyan, rumors of such a trip have persisted over the past few weeks both in Moscow and Latin American capitals.

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A trip through several Latin American countries by Mikoyan would be in line with intensified Soviet bloc diplomatic and commercial efforts in the area. Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay are particularly susceptible to Communist commercial offers in view of their agricultural surpluses and serious balance-of-payments problems.

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## 6. DANISH-SOVIET TRADE AGREEMENT

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[Redacted]

In the Danish-Soviet trade agreement signed in Copenhagen on 14 May the Danes gave in to the Russians on important points. They agreed to construct two 10,000-ton cargo vessels with a speed rated above that now considered acceptable by COCOM for exceptional export, failing at the same time to secure a Soviet commitment to purchase larger quantities of agricultural products. The Soviet negotiators apparently made the signing of a new agreement conditional on Denmark's agreeing to construct the two vessels.

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The pressure of domestic agricultural interests for more diversified markets was a major factor in inducing the Danish government to negotiate a new agreement to replace the one which expired in 1954. Negotiations for a new agreement broke down at that time when the Danes refused to construct tankers for the Soviet Union. During his visit to Moscow in March, however, Prime Minister Hansen indicated willingness to permit delivery of cargo vessels to the Soviet Union.

The Danish agreement to construct the two vessels is indicative of the prevailing view among many Western countries that trade with the Soviet bloc should be expanded.

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## 7. LENIN'S CRITICISM OF STALIN PUBLISHED IN USSR

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The 18 May 1956 issue of Komsomolskaya Pravda, official newspaper of the Communist Youth League, revealed to the Soviet public that Lenin, shortly before his death, had sharply criticized Stalin and warned the party against his use of power. The information was contained in an article entitled "A Young People's Guide to Stalinism." It was one of the strongest attacks on Stalin and the "cult of the individual" yet published.

"Lenin, in the last year of his life," the newspaper stated, "pointed out that such negative features of Stalin's character as rudeness, lack of respect for working comrades, capriciousness and inclination toward abuse of power could lead to a violation of the rules of collective leadership. Unfortunately it happened just that way."

The youth league's newspaper was selected as the medium for publishing Lenin's criticism because the youth of the Soviet Union is the group most firmly indoctrinated with Stalin hero worship, and more explanation is necessary in this case to justify the blackening of Stalin's name.

The newspaper, however, continued the established line that Stalin in his earlier years had made a positive contribution to the party and the Soviet state. The notes, which have become known as Lenin's testament, were quoted to show that Lenin had recognized the characteristics in Stalin that might lead to the establishment of a hero cult, but no mention was made of Lenin's proposal for his comrades on the central committee "to find a way to remove Stalin" from the position of secretary general of the party.

The full text of the testament was not published, probably because it would have the effect of putting Trotsky in a more favorable light than the current regime is willing to do.

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## 8. YUGOSLAVS AGREE TO INCREASE IN US MILITARY AID STAFF

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[Redacted]

Yugoslav foreign secretary Popovic told Ambassador Riddleberger on 16 April that the Yugoslav government would permit the immediate addition of five persons to the American Military Aid Staff (AMAS). Saying he was expressing the considered views of Marshal Tito, Popovic emphasized that his government recognized the importance of the American military aid program. American aid had enabled Yugoslavia to hold its own against the Soviet bloc and thereby helped effect the changes in Soviet policy which are now apparent.

Popovic said that, as the flow of deliveries under the military aid program is resumed, his government would cause no difficulty on further personnel questions. He strongly urged, however, that the United States not force the pace on new personnel assignments in order not to make more difficult Yugoslavia's policy toward the USSR.

Ambassador Riddleberger considers that this Yugoslav action has re-established the validity of the 1 October agreement between Tito and Deputy Under Secretary of State Murphy in which Yugoslavia agreed to accept at least 16 additional AMAS personnel.

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## 9. SINGAPORE SITUATION

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Talks on self-government for Singapore, which collapsed in London on 15 May, apparently will not be resumed by the present Singapore government despite

Chief Minister Marshall's request to do so on the basis of a new approach. Marshall does not have the support of his delegation, and the British colonial secretary has therefore refused to resume the talks.

If Marshall carries out his threat to resign when he gets back to Singapore, the Labor Front, of which he is the leader, or the Liberal Socialists will probably be given an opportunity to form a new coalition government. Such a government may hold successful negotiations with the British, but with representation in the legislative assembly already unrepresentative and with Communist subversion growing, any agreement would have little chance of gaining popular support.

New elections appear to be inevitable unless Britain exercises its right to suspend them. The Communist-manipulated People's Action Party appears likely to win any election in the near future. There are some indications that the British might risk dealing with a People's Action government rather than suspend the constitution.

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